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ABSTRACT: This study is dedicated to 
empirical testing of barriers to competition 
effect on productivity growth, taking into 
account the hypothesis that different poli-
cies improve economic growth in countries 
at different levels of technological develop-
ment. The results of econometric analysis of 
two panel data sets comprising 144 coun-
tries (not controlled for education) and 128 
countries (controlled for education) have 
demonstrated that when approaching the 
technology frontier, countries with high 
barriers to competition lose their produc-
tivity growth much faster than countries 
with a low barrier, which is the direct re-
sult of the decreasing but positive influence 
of barriers to competition on productivity 
growth, regardless of whether the economy 
is underdeveloped or advanced. This posi-
tive effect of barriers can be rationalized 
by Romer’s (1990) product variety model; 
or possibly by the inverted-U pattern be-
tween competition and innovation proved 
by Aghion et al. (2005), under the assump-
tion that these sample countries are on the 
downward slope. Finally, the positive effect 
of barriers, irrespective of the degree of the 
countries’ technological development, im-
plies that the theory is not completely con-
sistent with empirical data.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This study empirically tests the Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006) theory, 
which emphasises that non-competitive arrangements, like large firms and state 
intervention, can increase investment and adoption of frontier technologies, 
resulting in the fast convergence of relatively underdeveloped economies with 
more advanced economies. If this theory is correct, institutions and policies that 
create market rigidities and a less competitive environment are appropriate for 
relatively underdeveloped countries where convergence and economic growth 
are based on massive investment and technology adoption, and are 
inappropriate for more advanced economies whose development is based on 
innovation.  
According to Acemoglu et al. (2006), economic growth and increased 
productivity in economies far from the technological frontier are dominated by 
technology adoption, copying, and imitation, while in countries at a high level 
of technological development the influence of innovation is decisive. This 
theory suggests that policies pertaining to technologically underdeveloped 
countries should be based on encouraging investment and technology adoption, 
while policies for technologically more developed countries should be based on 
stimulating innovation. In other words, policies that encourage economic 
growth in underdeveloped countries differ from those suitable for developed 
economies.  
Acemoglu et al’s (2006) theory implies that non-competitive arrangements are 
appropriate for relatively underdeveloped nations because they can accelerate 
their convergence to the frontier, while they are detrimental and harmful to 
productivity growth in more advanced economies. This research tests the 
hypothesis that barriers to competition have negligible costs (or even benefits) 
for productivity growth in underdeveloped economies but they become much 
more destructive in the case of developed countries. 
The paper consists of five sections. Sections 1 and 2 cover the introduction and 
the theoretical background, respectively. Section 3 includes both the basic 
Schumpeterian theoretical growth model and the analytical framework with 
data. Section 4 discusses the results and section 5 concludes.  
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Schumpeterian growth theory is a theory of economic growth based on the 
Schumpeterian concept of creative destruction in which every innovation 
generates new technology that replaces previous technological solutions and 
leads to economic growth and increased productivity (Aghion, Akcigit, and 
Howitt 2013). This theory provides possibility of better understanding of 
growth underlying causal factors, emphasising incentives, policies and 
organisations, all of these strongly encouraging research and development 
(R&D) activities and innovations as a consequence thereof. Economic growth 
largely depends on policies related to intellectual property rights, competition, 
economic openness, business barriers, research education, democracy, etc., but 
it is important to stress that the impact of these factors and policies differs 
significantly depending on a country’s level of technological development.  
Aghion et al. (2013) propose the following four areas in which Schumpeterian 
growth theory offers specific results: (1) the effect that competition and market 
structure have on the process of economic growth, (2) the dependence between 
growth and firm dynamics, (3) the impact of long-term technological waves on 
economic growth, and (4) the relationship between growth and technological 
development, based on the hypothesis that different policies incite economic 
growth at different levels of technological development.  
The theory of Acemoglu et al. (2006) starts from a simple imaginary economy 
based on the following three assumptions: (1) entrepreneurs possess greater or 
lesser ability, (2) the loan market is characterised by limited loan potential and 
thus introduces restrictions on the amount of total investments, and (3) 
entrepreneurs participate in both innovation and imitation and the adoption of 
technology. This theory introduces the notion of selection, which pertains to the 
possibility of replacing low-skilled entrepreneurs with high-skilled 
entrepreneurs if such need exists. Due to the assumption of restricted loan 
potential, insider entrepreneurs are more advantaged than outsiders. Profits 
retained from current business enable insider entrepreneurs to realise 
considerably higher investment, which is very important for technology 
adoption and imitation. This factor can influence the decision to sensibly retain 
less-skilled entrepreneurs so that investment and imitation support strong 
economic growth. Such decisions mean consciously sacrificing selection in 
favour of investment, imitation, and technology adoption.  
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Since imitation and technology adoption are relatively simple and routine 
operations compared to the innovation process, Acemoglu et al. (2006) are of 
the opinion that by gradual technological and economic development, as 
innovation becomes more important for economic growth, giving up the 
selection of highly skilled entrepreneurs becomes more harmful and less 
probable. Observed dynamically, economies start from a low level of 
technological development, basing their economic growth on investment, 
imitation, and technology adoption. At this stage the skills of entrepreneurs and 
selection are far less important, while the emphasis is much more on the greater 
investment possibilities of insider entrepreneurs (investment-based strategy). 
Greater investment capacity protects insider entrepreneurs from selection. 
Investment, imitation, and technology adoption gradually lead to technological 
progress, which leads to economic and productivity growth. Technological 
progress and convergence towards the technological frontier make innovation 
ever more important, so that entrepreneurs’ skills and selection become 
important factors of growth. Economies gradually move to an innovation-based 
strategy and low-skilled entrepreneurs are replaced by highly skilled 
entrepreneurs.  
In relation to this theory, it is very important to define two key effects 
(Acemoglu et al. 2006, p.39). The first, known as the appropriability effect, 
occurs in conditions of monopolistic competition where companies bear the 
total investment cost leading to GDP growth and increased productivity but 
enjoy only part of the positive effects. Such relationship between costs and 
benefits results in partiality against great investments, which inhibits 
implementation of the investment-based strategy.  
The presence of an appropriability effect leads to the conclusion that state 
support is needed in the form of investment subsidies and anti-competition 
policies so as to reduce some of the investment costs borne by companies and to 
increase their investment benefits. In other words, for an investment-based 
strategy to be successfully implemented, states should intervene. Otherwise, this 
strategy could fail even if it is useful for economic growth. The second effect is 
the rent-shield effect, which is a consequence of the fact that retained profits 
(rents) enable insider entrepreneurs to realise the considerably greater 
investments that are of key importance for technology adoption, thus protecting 
them from being replaced by more efficient entrepreneurs. If this effect prevails 
over the appropriability effect the, economy will rely on investment-based 
strategy and imitation for far too long. This will reduce economic growth, since 
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the option of innovation is not used to its best advantage. Moreover, it is 
important to stress that there is a certain level of technological development, i.e., 
distance from the technological frontier, where convergence stops if the 
economy does not re-orient to an innovation-based strategy. This phenomenon 
is known as the non-convergence trap. 
Technological development in many less developed countries is based on 
innovations created in technologically superior economies. This phenomenon, 
known as the technology spillover effect, played an important role in Germany, 
France, and Russia’s economic convergence process towards being 
technologically more advanced economies in the 19th century (Gerschenkron, 
1962). Their convergence was realised primarily due to extensive investment 
and the adoption of advanced technological solutions from the most 
economically and technologically developed countries. According to Howitt 
(2000), in the long run all countries implementing R&D activities will grow at 
the same rate, while economies without such activities will not grow at all. 
Moreover, technologically underdeveloped countries can record higher 
economic growth rates than developed countries, given the possibility of 
realising greater technological progress every time they implement technology 
adoption and imitation. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) deem that in the long 
term the global economic growth rate is determined by discoveries in the 
technologically most developed countries. Less developed countries base 
economic growth and convergence towards more developed economies on 
imitation and copying, the cost of which is to a certain extent lower than that of 
innovation. The tendency of the cost of copying to gradually increase decreases 
growth rates in following countries so that they slowly converge to the growth 
rates of technologically more developed countries. On the other hand, certain 
models of economic growth lead to the conclusion that technology adoption 
that reduces labour requirements but raises capital requirements increases 
productivity gaps, which explains the large and constant international 
differences in the level of per capita income (Zeira 1998). Finally, models 
belonging to the Schumpeterian growth theory add to our understanding of why 
some countries stagnate while others converge to the level of income that is 
specific to the world technology frontier (Howitt and Mayer 2005). 
According to Acemoglu et al. (2006), highly developed skills and the selection of 
appropriate entrepreneurs play a far more important role in the innovation 
process than in the process of imitation and technology adoption. The opinion 
on great importance of entrepreneurs’ skills for research and development 
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(innovation) is consistent to the existing models of growth which potentiate 
great role of human capital in technological progress. Nelson and Phelps (1966) 
develop a model which formalises the relationship between capital structure and 
technological development, starting from the opinion that education is a process 
of investing in people and that educated people are leaders of human capital. 
According to this growth model, the more technologically progressive the 
economy the greater the benefit of education and human capital (rate of return 
to education). Such a relationship implies that the degree of technological 
development influences the optimal capital structure. If technology is dynamic 
and progressive, societies should increase human capital rather than physical 
capital. According to Galor and Tsiddon (1997), times of great technological 
discovery bring increased inequality, greater mobility, and concentration of 
highly skilled individuals in technologically progressive sectors, encouraging 
future technological progress and economic growth. When this technology 
becomes more available there is a decline in the concentration of highly skilled 
individuals in technologically progressive sectors, which significantly reduces 
the probability of further technological progress and slows down future 
economic growth. Hassler and Rodriguez Mora (2000) suggest that high 
economic growth increases a return to innate cognitive ability in which 
allocation of individuals depends more on innate ability and less on social 
origin. According to these authors, individuals with better innate cognitive 
abilities are better adapted to less known productive technologies and master 
them more easily, thus encouraging greater economic growth in the future. 
Taking into account the mentioned interdependence, it can be concluded that 
dynamic economic growth and allocation of individuals based on innate ability 
are mutually intensified. In addition, Aghion and Howitt (1992) develop a 
Schumpeterian growth model which implies that economic growth is solely a 
consequence of technological progress based on the competition between R&D 
firms generating innovation. According to this model, the average growth rate 
and the variance in the growth rate are growing functions of innovation, the size 
of the highly skilled labour force, and research productivity.  
3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
3.1. Basic theoretical growth model 
The basic theoretical growth model according to Aghion et al. (2013, pp.2–6), 
belongs to Schumpeterian growth theory and is characterised by the following 
three general properties: (1) innovation triggers economic growth, (2) 
innovation is the consequence of entrepreneurial investment motivated by the 
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possibility of realising post-innovation monopoly rents, and (3) every 
innovation generates new technology that replaces the old, meaning that 
creative destruction is an inherent component of economic growth. Time 
dimension and population (composed of infinitely lived individuals) are 
continual variables. Individuals have linear preferences and discount future 
values at the rate of ρ. Also, linear preferences imply that equilibrium interest 
rate r is equal to time preference rate ρ. Each individual possesses one work unit 
in the time unit, which can be allocated either to research and development 
activities or to the production of the intermediate good. The theoretical model 
implies production of one final and one intermediate good. The final good is 
produced in conditions of perfect competition based on the following 
production function: 
t t tY A y
  (1) 
where Y, y, A and α respectively present the volume of production of the final 
good in moment t, quantity of the intermediate good that is used for the 
production of the final good at moment t, productivity (quality) of the 
intermediate input, and elasticity of production with respect to the intermediate 
good.  
At the same time the production of the intermediate good is carried out under 
monopoly conditions, using labour as the only production input in a one-to-one 
proportion, which means that for each unit of the intermediate good of frontier 
quality one labour unit is spent. Taking into account this assumption, it is clear 
that yt at the same time denotes production volume of the intermediate good at 
moment t and number of labour units spent in production of the intermediate 
good. As already stated, Schumpeterian growth theory implies that economic 
growth appears as a consequence of innovation and creative destruction. The 
economic growth mechanism in this model is based on innovation, which 
consequently results in more productive (quality) intermediate good, the use of 
which results in greater production of the final good. In other words, if level of 
quality (productivity) of the intermediate good used at the moment is A, the 
first following innovation will generate the new intermediate good productivity, 
which will be γA, where γ >1. The innovator who generated the new 
intermediate good pushes the previous innovator out of the market, since he can 
produce a more productive (quality) good with identical labour unit costs, 
which is a process of creative destruction, implying both positive and negative 
external effects. According to Aghion and Howitt (1992, p.330), positive 
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external effects, or ‘intertemporal knowledge spillover’, are reflected in the fact 
that innovation permanently increases productivity, thus generating new 
knowledge which is the basis for future innovations. Negative external effects, 
known as ‘business-stealing effects’, result from the fact that every new 
innovation destroys the post-innovation monopoly rent of the previous 
innovator (Aghion and Howitt 1992, p.325). The probability that innovation 
occurs within time interval [t, t+dt] is equal to λztdt, where λ stands for 
probability of innovation if R&D activities engage one labour unit, zt stands for 
total number of labour units engaged in the R&D sector at moment t, and dt 
stands for very short time interval.  
This model of economic growth is based on two key equations. The first is 
known as the labour market clearing equation and can be simply presented as: 
t t tL y z   (2) 
where Lt, yt, and zt respectively denote continuous population at moment t 
composed of infinitely lived individuals (Lt), total number of labour units 
engaged in the production of the intermediate good at moment t (yt), and total 
number of labour units engaged in R&D operations at moment t (zt). The 
labour market clearing equation implies that the total number of labour units 
(number of individuals) engaged in the production of the intermediate good 
and in the R&D sector in every time unit is equal to the total population (total 
labour supply). The model focuses on constant allocation of labour between the 
production of the intermediate good and R&D activity, which means that it 
does not change in time.  
In equilibrium, individuals are indifferent between working in the sector 
producing the intermediate good and in the R&D sector. The second structural 
equation of the model is based on this fact and is known as the research 
arbitrage equation. Taking into account that Schumpeterian growth models 
recognise innovation and creative destruction as the only triggers of economic 
growth, all variables in the model remain unchanged in the period between two 
consecutive innovations. If we assume that in the period between t=0 and 
current t a total of k innovations were realised, the wage rate can be marked as 
ωk, and the net present value of the post-innovation monopoly profit (rent) that 
will be achieved by the next ((k+1)-th) innovator as Vk+1.  
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In the course of the short time interval dt between two consecutive innovations 
(k-th and (k+1)-th), every individual has two options at their disposal. The first 
is to engage their own available labour unit in the time unit for the production 
of the intermediate good and to gain earnings of ωkdt. An alternative is that the 
available labour unit in the unit of time is used for the needs of the R&D sector, 
where with probability of λdt it will generate the following ((k+1)-th) 
innovation and gain right on post-innovation the monopoly rent Vk+1, but with 
the risk that no innovation occurs and no rent is gained. In the equilibrium state 
every individual will be indifferent between engaging in the production of the 
intermediate good and in R&D activities. Formalisation of this condition leads 
us to the research arbitrage equation:  
1k kdt dtV   , (3) 
i.e.: 
1k kV   . (4) 
Starting from equation (4), Aghion et al. (2013) implicitly assume that the next 
innovator will not be the individual that generated the last k-th innovation, 
since post-innovation rent for that individual, if they become the next 
innovator, increases from Vk to Vk+1, while in the case of any other individual it 
increases from zero to Vk+1. According to equation (4), if all outsiders are 
individuals indifferent between the production of intermediate goods and R&D 
activities, then the k-th innovator (insider) will strictly prefer production of the 
intermediate good. 
The net present value of post-innovation monopoly profit (Vk+1) is determined 
by the Bellman equation. If we assume that the (k+1)-th is the last generated 
innovation and that the monopoly producer of the intermediate good collects at 
every moment a post-innovation monopoly profit to the amount of πk+1, the 
total profit that will be realised in the short period of time dt amounts to πk+1dt. 
In addition, if we assume that no next (k+2)-th innovation will happen, the 
existing monopoly producer of the intermediate good ((k+1)-th innovator) will 
collect profit infinitely, i.e., the net present value of the post-innovation 
monopoly profit will be: 
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1 1
1
0
k k
k rtV dte r
   
   , (5) 
taking into account that equilibrium interest rate r is equal to time preference 
rate ρ (exponential growth rate). From equation (5) it is concluded that: 
1 1k kV r   , (6) 
so the net present value of profit Vk+1 can be reformulated as: 
 1 1 11k k kV dt rdt V      . (7) 
If the unreal assumption that no next (k+2)-th innovation will occur is 
abandoned, at the end of the very short time period dt the monopoly producer 
of the intermediate good will either be pushed out of the market by means of 
creative destruction (with probability of λztdt) or will retain the monopoly 
position and Vk+1 (with probability of 1-λztdt). Accordingly, the net present 
value of the post-innovation rent can be presented by the Bellman equation:  
   1 1 1
0
1
1
t
k k
t k
z dt
V dt rdt
z dt V


  
 
       
. (8) 
Based on equation (8), it is observed that in the case of ultimately certain 
creative destruction (λztdt=1; 1-λztdt=0) the net present value of the post-
innovation profit of the (k+1)-th innovator is equal to the profit at the initial 
moment of time (t=0) when the (k+1)-th innovation is generated. If 
preservation of the monopoly position is certain (λztdt=0; 1-λztdt=1), the net 
present value of the post-innovation profit of the (k+1)-th innovator is 
formalised through equation (7). In all remaining cases, the net present value 
can be formulated as:  
2
1 1 1 1 1 1k k k t k k t kV dt V z dtV rdtV z rdt V            . (9) 
If both sides of equation (9) are divided by dt, under condition that dt→0 and 
that r=ρ, the following is obtained: 
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1 1
1 1 1
k k
k t k k
V V
z V V
dt dt
         , (10) 
i.e.: 
1
1
k
k
t
V
z

 

   . (11) 
Based on equation (11), it is noticeable that the net present value of the post-
innovation monopoly rent is equal to the quotient of the post-innovation 
monopoly profit which the (k+1)-th innovator realises in the unit of time and 
risk-adjusted rate of time preference, where the possibility of creative 
destruction appears as a risk with probability of λzt in the unit of time.  
If we assume that by moment t a total of k innovations has been generated, 
solving the model goes to finding the equilibrium value of post-innovation 
monopoly profit (πk), the equilibrium quantity of work consumed by R&D 
activities (zt), and the equilibrium expected economic growth rate (E(gt)). 
Taking into account that the productivity (quality) of the intermediate good 
increases by γ times with every new innovation, the productivity of the latest k-
th intermediate good will amount to Ak=γk. Starting from the earlier-introduced 
assumption that the final good is produced under perfect competition 
conditions, the profit maximisation of the final good producers requires that the 
monopoly producer of the intermediate good formulates the price of input at 
the level of its marginal product, which formally requires equality of input 
prices and the first derivative of production function (1):  
1( )k k tp y A y
  . (12) 
This relation actually presents the inverse demand function faced by the 
monopoly producer of the intermediate good. He also tends to maximise its 
post-innovation monopoly profit, taking into account the condition formalised 
by equation (12): 
max ( )k k t k ty p y y y   . (13) 
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Taking into account that the inverse demand function faced by a monopoly 
producer of the intermediate good is known (equation 12), equations of total 
and marginal revenue can be simply formulated as: 
( )k t k tp y y A y
 , (14) 
  2 1( )k t
k t
t
d p y y
A y
dy
  . (15) 
The condition for the profit maximisation of the monopoly producer of the 
intermediate good is the equality of its marginal cost (ωk) and marginal revenue 
(equation 15): 
2 1
k k tA y
   , (16) 
which can also be written as: 
1
2
k
t
k
y
A
 

  . (17) 
Placing equation (17) in equation (12) gives that the equilibrium prices of the 
intermediate good are equal to the amount of wage rate (marginal cost) 
increased by constant margin: 
( ) kkp y

 . (18) 
Bearing in mind this fact, the equilibrium post-innovation profit of the 
monopoly producer can be simply expressed by placing equation (18) in the 
profit equation: 
( )k k t k tp y y y   ,  (19) 
giving: 
1
k k ty
 
 . (20)  
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This last relationship indicates that equilibrium post-innovation monopoly 
profit is equal to the product of constant (1-α)/α and labour costs.  
The next step in solving the model is deriving the equilibrium amount of labour 
consumed in the R&D sector. Placing equations (11) and (20) in the research 
arbitrage equation (4), the following is obtained: 
1
1
k t
k
t
y
z
   


  , (21) 
which can also be written as: 
1
1
k t
t
k
y
z
   


  . (22) 
From equations (16) and (2) the following is obtained: 
2 1 2 1
1 1k k k kA y A y
          , (23)  
t t ty L z  , (24) 
placement of which in equations (22) and further calculation will give the 
equilibrium amount of labour consumed by R&D activities: 
1
11
t
L
z
  
 
 
 
. (25) 
Equation (25) indicates that the equilibrium amount of labour consumed by 
R&D activities is a growing function of λ, γ, and L, and at the same time a 
decreasing function of α and ρ.  
Finally, once the equilibrium amount of labour consumed by R&D activities is 
established, it is simple to determine the equilibrium expected economic growth 
rate. If it is known that λztdt is the probability of realising a new innovation in 
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the short time period dt, and that each innovation is followed by increased 
production of the final good by γ times, production of the final good at moment 
t+dt can be formulated as: 
tz dt
t dt tY Y
  . (26) 
Applying logarithm to equation (26), the following is obtained: 
     ln ln lnt dt t tY z dt Y    .  (27) 
Deducting ln(Yt) from both sides of equation (27), the following is obtained: 
     ln ln lnt dt t tY Y z dt    ,  (28) 
which, after being divided by dt with the condition that dt→0, gives the 
equilibrium expected continual economic growth rate: 
       
0
ln ln
lim lnt dt tt tdt
Y Y
E g z
dt
 

  .  (29) 
From equation (29) it can be concluded that the equilibrium expected economic 
growth rate is directly correlated with the probability of innovation (creative 
destruction) in unit of time λzt. This basic model formalises the mechanism by 
which innovation and creative destruction influence: (1) the equilibrium price 
of the intermediate good (pk(y)), (2) the equilibrium wage rate (ωk), (3) the 
equilibrium post-innovation monopoly profit (πk), and finally (4) the 
equilibrium expected economic growth rate (E(gt)).  
Formalisation of Acemoglu et al’s (2006) basic idea that productivity in 
technologically underdeveloped economies is dominated by imitation and 
adoption of frontier technology and in technologically developed countries by 
innovation can be most easily achieved by shifting from continuous to discrete 
time (Aghion et al. 2013, p.21). It was assumed that At, Ãt, μn and μm respectively 
denote current average productivity in the observed country, current frontier 
productivity, the fraction of sectors that innovate and the fraction of sectors that 
imitate. If we understand innovation, according to the presented model, as 
multiplying productivity by factor γ, and imitation as simple convergence 
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towards frontier productivity, an increase in productivity between two 
successive periods can be presented as: 
   1 1t t n t m t tA A A A A       % , (30) 
i.e.: 
   11 1 1t tt n m t
t
A A
g a
A
         ,  (31) 
where at = At / Ãt, and gt stands for the productivity growth rate between two 
consecutive time periods. Equation (31) indicates that the closer the country is 
to the technology frontier (at closer to one), the more dependent on innovation 
and policies that stimulate its productivity growth it is; and, vice versa, the 
further the country is from the technology frontier (at closer to zero), the more 
dependent its productivity growth is on imitation and imitation-enhancing 
policies. 
3.2. Analytical framework and data 
As mentioned earlier in the paper, the empirical research in this study is based 
on the analytical framework developed and applied by Acemoglu et al. (2006, 
p.41) and on their claim, reflecting the essence of this research, that: “Our 
analysis also implies that barriers to competition should have limited costs (or 
even benefits) when countries are far from the world technology frontier but 
should become much more costly near the frontier”. We classified all countries 
in the sample into low-barrier and high-barrier countries and then estimated 
the effects of convergence to productivity growth in both groups. The 
specification of the first panel two-way error component regression model we 
used is as follows: 
1 1 2 1it it it i t itYC HBPPTF LBPPTF          . (32) 
In this regression YC, HBPPTF, and LBPPTF respectively present productivity 
growth rate in country i between t-1 and t and the interaction terms of high-
barrier (HBP) and low barrier (LBP) dummies with proximity to frontier 
measures (PTF) in country i on date t-1. Dummy variables HBP and LBP take 
unit values in the case of high-barrier and low-barrier countries, respectively, 
and zero in other cases. Regressor PTF measures how close productivity in the 
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observed country is to the frontier productivity level (productivity level in the 
most productive country). Interaction terms (HBPPTF and LBPPTF) stand for 
proximity to frontier measures separately for high-barrier and low-barrier 
countries. It is very important to emphasise that the focus of this research is not 
disclosing different determinants of productivity growth and estimating the 
character and intensity of their influence, but checking the empirical 
consistency of Acemoglu et al’s (2006) theory. To this end, we are 
predominantly interested in the sign of coefficients α1 and α2 and in their 
significance and mutual relationship, rather than in their values. If the observed 
theory is compatible with the empirical data, both estimates should be 
statistically significant and negative, while α1 should be higher in absolute terms. 
Such a finding would indicate that gradual convergence towards the 
technological frontier slows down productivity growth more vigorously in 
countries with high barriers to competition. 
The second panel two-way error component regression model comprises 
proximity to frontier measures (PTF) in country i at date t-1, average barriers to 
competition (BP) in country i between t-1 and t, and the interaction term 
between them (BP*PTF). 
 3 1 4 5 1*it it it it it i t itYC PTF BP BP PTF             (33) 
According to Acemoglu et al. (2006), this research was conducted with and 
without controlling for education effect. Regression models that included the 
education variable were estimated on a sample of 128 countries (Table 2A – 
Appendix), while the remaining equations were estimated on a sample of 144 
countries (Table 1A – Appendix), which was determined by data availability. In 
the case of the model without education, the sample covers the period from 
2004 to 2016 and is divided into three sub-periods of four years each (2004–
2008, 2008–2012, 2012–2016). When the panel data sample was devised, every 
four-year period was treated as one time observation. In other words the basic 
panel data sample, if the education effect is not controlled for, is composed of 
432 observations (N=144, T=3).  
The panel data sample that controls for the influence of education covers the 
period 2005–2015 and is divided into two five-year sub-periods (2005–2010, 
2010–2015), where each sub-period stands for one time observation. The reason 
for dividing the time dimension of the sample into two five-year periods rather 
than three four-year periods, as is the case without education variable, can be 
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found in the fact that education statistics (the so-called Barro-Lee series) are 
published in five-year intervals (1950, 1955,..., 2005, 2010). Therefore, the basic 
panel data sample with the education variable included in the models comprises 
a total of 256 observations (N=128, T=2).  
The dependent variable (YC) in both regression models is average annual 
growth rate of GDP per worker in four-year periods (without education) and in 
five-year periods (with education), expressed in percentages. According to 
Djankov et al. (2002), barriers to competition represent the average number of 
procedures necessary to open a business in a four-year period (without 
education) or five-year period (with education). Classification of countries into 
high-barrier and low-barrier countries was based on whether the average value 
of barriers to competition was lower than the median barrier value of 8 (low-
barrier), or was higher or equal (high-barrier). Proximity to frontier measures 
(PTF) were expressed in percentages and constructed as the ratio of the 
country’s GDP per worker to the GDP per worker in Luxembourg (constant 
2011 PPP $), both calculated at the beginning of each period (first year of the 
period). The control variable for education stands for the average years of 
education completed among people older than 25 at the beginning of each five-
year period (in 2005 and in 2010). Data on GDP per person employed and 
number of start-up procedures to register a business was downloaded from the 
World Development Indicators database (World Bank), while data on average 
years of education completed among people over age 25 was sourced from the 
Education Statistics database (World Bank). 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The first step in econometric modelling is the estimation of two-way fixed 
effects error component models (Least Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV), 
Tables 1 and 2) and elimination of influential observations applying DFITS 
(Welsch and Kuh 1977) and Cook’s Distance (Cook 1977) statistics.1 The results 
of testing the normal distribution of the error term, obtained by applying several 
statistical tests (D’Agostino, Belanger, and D’Agostino 1990 with and without 
correction developed by Royston 1991; Shapiro and Wilk 1965 based on 
Royston 1982, 1992, 1993b; Shapiro and Francia 1972 based on Royston 1983, 
1993a; Jarque and Bera 1980, 1987), robustly indicate that the error term is 
                                                            
1  All results that are not presented in this paper are available on request from the authors. 
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normally distributed in all LSDV error component models estimated on 
reduced samples (without influential points). Application of different 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation tests (Breusch and Pagan 1979/ Cook 
and Weisberg 1983; Koenker 1981; Wooldridge 2013; Szroeter 1978; Greene 
2003, p.324; Cumby and Huizinga 1992) indicate their presence in all LSDV 
models. Although cross-sectional dependencies are not much of a problem in 
micro panels (few years and large number of cross-sections), they are tested in 
any case. In LSDV models with education, application of Friedman (1937) and 
Pesaran (2004) CD tests, relevant in panel data models with small T and large N, 
indicate that there is no cross-section dependence (correlation) in residuals. In 
the case of the LSDV models without education, application of the mentioned 
cross-section dependence tests is not possible (because of the calculation 
problem caused by elimination of influential observation), due to which 
heteroscedasticity, serial-correlation- consistent and spatial-correlation-
consistent Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors are also estimated for 
precautionary reasons. Heteroscedasticity and serial correlation robust F-
statistics indicate that individual and time dummy variables are statistically 
significant at the 1% significance level in all LSDV models. At the same time, 
application of Breusch and Pagan (1980) and Honda (1985) tests indicates the 
significance of individual effects and the insignificance of time unobservable 
effects in all model specifications. Since robust F-tests indicate the significance 
of fixed individual and time effects and LM tests disclose the significance of 
individual stochastic effects (but not time stochastic effects), the next testing 
phase pertains to application of the autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity 
robust Hausman test (Arellano 1993) in order to distinguish between two-way 
mixed error component models (with random individual and fixed time effects) 
and two-way fixed-effects error component models (with fixed individual and 
time effects). Based on the obtained results the zero hypothesis is sovereignly 
rejected at the 1% significance level, which implies that there is correlation 
between the regressors and stochastic individual effects, due to which the fixed 
effects models with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard 
errors are finally estimated. In order to check the robustness of the findings the 
same models are estimated in the form of Prais-Winsten (PW) regressions with 
panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) and by applying feasible generalised 
least squares (FGLS) methods both with common and panel-specific AR(1) 
coefficients. Estimation using these techniques is possible only in the case of the 
model without education, on the complete sample of 432 observations, because 
elimination of influential observations and too small time dimensions in models 
with education generate calculation problems. 
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Finally, as Acemoglu et al. (2006) point out, variables that contain proximity to 
the frontier (HBPPTF, LBPPTF, PTF, and BPPTF) are correlated with the lags 
of the dependent variable, implying that the strict exogeneity assumption has to 
be violated (Wooldridge 2002, p.255). This is the basic reason why models are 
also estimated applying the two-step efficient generalised method of moments 
(GMM), which generates estimates efficient for arbitrary heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation and statistics robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, 
whereby instrumental variables are created through the observation ordinal 
number method and two groups method. Testing of underidentification, weak 
identification, and over-identifying restrictions is implemented by applying 
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM statistics, the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) 
Wald rk F statistic (with Stock and Yogo 2002, TSLS critical values), and the 
Hansen (1982) J statistic, respectively, which are valid when the i.i.d. 
assumption is violated. In the case of GMM estimations of model (32), with and 
without education (Table1), the mentioned tests indicate that instruments are 
exogenous at the 10% significance level, and equations are identified at the 1% 
significance level without weak identification problems. GMM estimations of 
model (33), with and without education (Table2), give results that point to 
models identification at the 1% significance level and instruments exogeneity at 
the 10% level. It is important to draw attention to the fact that the null 
hypothesis of weak identification in the case of model (33) without education is 
rejected at the 5% level only when weak instruments are defined as variables that 
potentially cause: 1) 10% or more asymptotic bias relative to OLS estimators, 
and 2) 20% or more test size of a 5% Wald test for endogenous regressors. Also, 
if model (33) with education is in question the week identification null 
hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level only when weak instruments are 
understood as variables that potentially cause 25% or more Wald test size, if the 
true rejection rate is 5%. Bearing in mind these weak instruments test results, it 
is necessary to be somewhat cautious when discussing them. Because of the 
potential existence of a weak instruments problem, in addition to the 
aforementioned tests the Anderson and Rubin (1949) Wald test and Stock and 
Wright (2000) SLM tests, which are robust to weak instruments, were 
conducted. In both versions (with and without education) of model (33), these 
tests convincingly confirm the significance of all endogenous regressors. 
Finally, as obtained on the basis of LSDV estimation results, estimating FGLS, 
PW, and GMM equations robustly confirms the significance of cross-section 
and time dummies in both versions (with and without education) of both 
models (32 and 33).  
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Table 1. Estimation results of regression (32) 
  
LSDV 
 
FGLS 
(1) 
 
FGLS 
(2) 
 PW 
(PCSE) 
(1) 
 PW 
(PCSE) 
(2) 
 
GMM 
 
LSDV 
 
GMM 
                 
HBPPTF (α1)  -0.514 
(0.121)* 
[0.099]* 
{0.130}*** 
 -0.542 
(0.035)* 
 
 -0.575 
(0.025)* 
 
 
 -0.570 
(0.107)* 
 
 -0.604 
(0.108)* 
 
 -1.544 
(0.347)* 
 
 -0.555 
(0.147)* 
[0.127]* 
 
 -1.135 
(0.280)* 
 
LBPPTF (α2)  -0.196 
(0.063)* 
[0.052]* 
{0.090} 
 -0.202 
(0.025)* 
 
 -0.231 
(0.017)* 
 
 
 -0.229 
(0.088)* 
 
 -0.247 
(0.087)* 
 
 -0.785 
(0.200)* 
 
 -0.298 
(0.110)* 
[0.095]* 
 
 -0.545 
(0.153)* 
 
p-equality  0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  0.0004  0.0002  0.0013  0.0343  0.0051 
Education  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  YES  YES 
No. of obs.   399  432  432  432  432  432  232  256 
R2  0.76  -  -  0.72  0.74  0.47  0.88  0.73 
Endogeneity 
test (p)  
Both           0.0002    0.0006 
HBPPTF           0.0035    0.0077 
LBPPTF           0.0002    0.0037 
Source: Authors' calculation 
Notes: Values in parentheses, brackets, and braces are Rogers (1993), Newey and West (1987) and 
Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors. The labels (1) and (2) respectively represents common 
and panel specific AR(1) coefficients. Also, asterisks *, ** and *** denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% significance level.  
The estimation results of model (32) (Table 1) show that all α1 and α2 coefficients 
are negative and highly significant at the 1% level, except in case of using the 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in model without education, where α1 is 
significant at the 10% level and α2 is insignificant. Estimators obtained by all 
methods reveal that the absolute value of α1 is significantly higher than the 
absolute value of α2, which implies a considerably faster decline of productivity 
growth rate in countries with high barriers to competition as they converge to 
the frontier. Also, testing the null hypothesis of equality of α1 and α2 parameters 
(lower part of Table 1) produces convincing results that the parameters are 
significantly different. It is important to emphasise that these findings are 
completely consistent with the tested theory.  
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Table 2. Estimation results of regression (33) 
  
LSDV 
 
FGLS 
(1) 
 
FGLS 
(2) 
 PW 
(PCSE) 
(1) 
 PW 
(PCSE) 
(2) 
 
GMM 
 
LSDV 
 
GMM 
                 
PTF (α3)  –0.238 
(0.061)* 
[0.056]* 
{0.108} 
 –0.259 
(0.018)* 
 
 –0.298 
(0.014)* 
 
 
 –0.303 
(0.079)* 
 
 –0.333 
(0.081)* 
 
 –1.271 
(0.268)* 
 
 –0.362 
(0.066)* 
[0.082]* 
 
 –0.404 
(0.229)*** 
 
BP (α4)  0.531 
(0.141)* 
[0.123]* 
{0.019}* 
 0.617 
(0.024)* 
 0.663 
(0.030)* 
 0.597 
(0.135)* 
 0.637 
(0.136)* 
 1.150 
(0.241)* 
 0.350 
(0.135)** 
(0.166)** 
 0.533 
(0.236)** 
BPPTF (α5)  –0.026 
(0.006)* 
[0.006]* 
{0.001}* 
 –0.031 
(0.001)* 
 
 –0.034 
(0.001)* 
 
 
 –0.029 
(0.006)* 
 
 –0.031 
(0.006)* 
 
 –0.073 
(0.015)* 
 
 –0.017 
(0.006)* 
[0.007]** 
 
 –0.042 
(0.015)* 
 
Education  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  YES  YES 
No. of obs.   393  432  432  432  432  432  230  256 
R2  0.78  -  -  0.72  0.74  0.30  0.89  0.73 
Endogeneity 
test (p)  
Both           0.0000    0.0156 
PTF           0.0003    0.7608 
BPPTF           0.0005    0.0065 
Source: Authors' calculation 
Notes: Values in parentheses, brackets, and braces are Rogers (1993), Newey and West (1987) and 
Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors. The labels (1) and (2) respectively represents common 
and panel specific AR(1) coefficients. Also, asterisks *, ** and *** denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% significance level.  
Obtained estimates for model (33) (Table 2) indicate negative and statistically 
significant α3 and α5 parameters, mostly at the 1% significance level. In addition, 
the results also point to positive α4 parameters that are statistically significant, 
predominantly at the 1% significance level. Model (33) implies a PTF effect on 
productivity growth equal to α3 + α5*BP. Estimations of parameters α3 and α5 
definitely confirm the finding related to model (32) that productivity growth 
diminishes as countries move towards the frontier, and this effect is much 
stronger in countries with high barriers to competition. The second important 
fact pertains to the effect that BP has on productivity growth, which is equal to 
α4 + α5*PTF. On the basis of the presented results it is clear that this effect is a 
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declining function of PTF and always positive (regardless of the PTF value; i.e., 
regardless of the degree of countries’ technological and economic development). 
In that sense, it is important to point out that when countries are moving 
towards the frontier, productivity growth decreases because of two effects: 1) the 
main effect that PTF has on productivity growth that is quantified by α3, and 2) 
the additional effect that PTF has on BP’s multiplicator which is measured by α5. 
The results of positive BP influence on productivity growth for both 
underdeveloped and advanced countries are not consistent with the examined 
theory. This finding is in direct conflict with Acemoglu et al’s (2006, p.38) 
attitude that non-competitive arrangements, which are appropriate for relatively 
underdeveloped nations because they can improve their convergence to the 
frontier, are not beneficial for more advanced economies. It means that barriers 
to entry are more harmful to productivity growth closer to the frontier; i.e., they 
become much more costly for advanced countries. Likewise, Aghion et al. (2013 
p.23) formulate the prediction, based on the observed theory, that: “High entry 
barriers become increasingly detrimental to growth as the country approaches 
the frontier”, which is not proved by the results of this study. The findings 
presented in this paper show that countries with high barriers to competition 
lose their productivity growth more rapidly was they approach the world 
technology frontier, but this does not mean that barriers have a negative impact 
on growth, and these two findings should not be confused. Namely, the faster 
atrophying of high-barrier countries’ growth as they converge to the frontier is a 
direct consequence of the fact that reduction of growth rate is a function of 
barrier values, which has already been shown using the PTF multiplicator 
equation (α3 + α5*BP). In other words, according to these findings, as countries 
with high barriers to competition become increasingly developed, productivity 
growth is quickly reduced, but they also still have a higher growth rate.  
If the claim that underdeveloped countries’ productivity growth is 
predominantly influenced by imitation and advanced economies’ productivity 
growth is predominantly the consequence of innovation is accepted as true, the 
results of this study indicate that barriers to competition enhance both 
innovation and imitation. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Econometric analysis of two panel data sets comprising 128 and 144 countries 
(with and without controls for education), respectively covering the periods 
2005–2015 and 2004–2016, generates the clear and robust result that countries 
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with high barriers to competition realise notably larger productivity growth 
decline than low-barrier countries as they approach the technology frontier, 
which is the corollary of the diminishing influence of barriers to competition on 
productivity growth. From the perspective of this result, the growth theory 
empirically checked in this study is unquestionable. This conclusion is forcefully 
confirmed by the estimation results of both model specifications used. The 
second important finding is that barriers to competition have a positive impact 
on productivity growth, which is contrary to the tested theory. Although 
productivity growth declines more rapidly in countries with high barriers than 
in countries with low barriers, when they approach the frontier it is still larger. 
Bearing in mind these results, we conclude that the observed theory is not 
completely consistent with empirical data. Finding that barriers to competition 
enhance productivity growth can be explained by Romer (1990)’s product 
variety model, which implies detrimental effect of competition to innovation 
and growth, i.e. competition reduces post-innovation rents and discourages 
innovation and growth. Another possible explanation could be the inverted-U 
relationship between competition and innovation confirmed by Aghion, Bloom, 
Blundell, Griffith and Howitt (2005), under the assumption that these panel 
data sets include countries that are in the downward-sloping part. However, an 
explanation of the decreasing influence of barriers to competition on 
productivity growth is outside the scope of this research and cannot be derived 
from its results, but could be an intriguing topic for future research. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1A. Countries in the panel data sample (models without education effect)  
Afghanistan Lao PDR 
Albania Latvia 
Algeria Lebanon 
Angola Lesotho 
Argentina Lithuania 
Armenia Macedonia, FYR 
Australia Madagascar 
Austria Malawi 
Azerbaijan Malaysia 
Bangladesh Maldives 
Belarus Mali 
Belgium Mauritania 
Benin Mauritius 
Bhutan Mexico 
Bolivia Moldova 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Mongolia 
Botswana Morocco 
Brazil Mozambique 
Bulgaria Namibia 
Burkina Faso Nepal 
Burundi Netherlands 
Cambodia New Zealand 
Cameroon Nicaragua 
Canada Niger 
Central African Republic Nigeria 
Chad Norway 
Chile Pakistan 
China Panama 
Colombia Papua New Guinea 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Paraguay 
Congo, Rep. Peru 
Costa Rica Philippines 
Cote d'Ivoire Poland 
Croatia Portugal 
Czech Republic Romania 
Denmark Russian Federation 
Dominican Republic Rwanda 
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Ecuador Samoa 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Sao Tome and Principe 
El Salvador Senegal 
Eritrea Serbia 
Estonia Sierra Leone 
Ethiopia Singapore 
Fiji Slovak Republic 
Finland Slovenia 
France Solomon Islands 
Georgia South Africa 
Germany Spain 
Ghana Sri Lanka 
Greece Sudan 
Guatemala Sweden 
Guinea Switzerland 
Guyana Tanzania 
Haiti Thailand 
Honduras Timor-Leste 
Hong Kong SAR, China Togo 
Hungary Tonga 
Iceland Tunisia 
India Turkey 
Indonesia Uganda 
Iran, Islamic Rep. Ukraine 
Iraq United Kingdom 
Ireland United States 
Israel Uruguay 
Italy Uzbekistan 
Jamaica Vanuatu 
Japan Venezuela, RB 
Jordan Vietnam 
Kazakhstan West Bank and Gaza 
Kenya Yemen, Rep. 
Korea, Rep. Zambia 
Kyrgyz Republic Zimbabwe 
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Table 2A. Countries in the panel data sample (models with education effect)  
Afghanistan Lao PDR 
Albania Latvia 
Algeria Lesotho 
Argentina Lithuania 
Armenia Malawi 
Australia Malaysia 
Austria Maldives 
Bangladesh Mali 
Belgium Mauritania 
Belize Mauritius 
Benin Mexico 
Bolivia Moldova 
Botswana Mongolia 
Brazil Morocco 
Bulgaria Mozambique 
Burundi Namibia 
Cambodia Nepal 
Cameroon Netherlands 
Canada New Zealand 
Central African Republic Nicaragua 
Chile Niger 
China Norway 
Colombia Pakistan 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Panama 
Congo, Rep. Papua New Guinea 
Costa Rica Paraguay 
Cote d'Ivoire Peru 
Croatia Philippines 
Czech Republic Poland 
Denmark Portugal 
Dominican Republic Romania 
Ecuador Russian Federation 
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Egypt, Arab Rep. Rwanda 
El Salvador Senegal 
Estonia Serbia 
Fiji Sierra Leone 
Finland Singapore 
France Slovak Republic 
Gabon Slovenia 
Gambia, The South Africa 
Germany Spain 
Ghana Sri Lanka 
Greece Sudan 
Guatemala Swaziland 
Guyana Sweden 
Haiti Switzerland 
Honduras Tajikistan 
Hong Kong SAR, China Tanzania 
Hungary Thailand 
Iceland Togo 
India Tonga 
Indonesia Trinidad and Tobago 
Iran, Islamic Rep. Tunisia 
Iraq Turkey 
Ireland Uganda 
Israel Ukraine 
Italy United Kingdom 
Jamaica United States 
Japan Uruguay 
Jordan Venezuela, RB 
Kazakhstan Vietnam 
Kenya Yemen, Rep. 
Korea, Rep. Zambia 
Kyrgyz Republic Zimbabwe 
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